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Abstract: Mobility is now the central focus of the lives of European citizens in 
business, education, and leisure. This will be enriched by pervasiveness in the future. 
The Daidalos vision is to seamlessly integrate heterogeneous network technologies 
that allow network operators and service providers to offer new and profitable 
services, giving users access to a wide range of pervasive, personalised voice, data, 
and multimedia services. This paper discusses the security issues that need to be 
addressed to make Daidalos a real viable solution for future pervasive mobility. 
Issues include among others privacy & identity management, secure protocols, 
distributed key management, security in ad hoc networks. 
 
1. Introduction 
The growth in the capabilities of telecommunication networks has spurned the development 
of new paradigms that are made possible by these new capabilities - one of which is 
pervasive networks. Pervasive networks allow technology to weave seamlessly into 
everyday life, continuously monitoring users and their usage patterns, learning and pre-
empting requirements. In this environment the trend is towards a more open market, 
increasing the potential for more services and unlocking users from the single provider 
scenario. 
 Continuous "surveillance" of users in such a network, where there are many potential 
services using this detailed information, means security and privacy becomes a cornerstone 
issue. Technical support for security and privacy protection must be greatly improved as 
compared to today's systems in which a large portion of an operators security framework 
consists of organisational policies and contracts. 
 Daidalos [1] is a European research project comprising major European operators 
designing such a future telecommunication system. Using two key scenarios (1) University 
Scenario and (2) the Automotive Mobility Scenario, it has a user centric approach to design. 
Such an approach avoids a technology driven system and keeps focus on user and market 
requirements at all times and at all levels of development. 
 In the next section a high level description of the Daidalos model and the security issues 
that lie within it are introduced. The paper continues in section 2.2.1 by describing 
Daidalos’ underlying approach to achieving privacy protection. Section 2.2.2 defines the 
security and privacy support of the Pervasive Service Platform (PSP). The paper continues 
to describe in section 2.2.3 protection provided by the Service Provisioning Platform (SPP). 
The paper finishes with a presentation of the security and privacy mechanisms of the access 
networks including sensor networks. 
2. Daidalos Security Infrastructure 
To understand the security solutions presented in this paper, it is necessary to know the 
underlying architecture. Therefore, a short overview on the architecture is given in section 
2.1. 
2.1 – Underlying Architecture 
The Daidalos infrastructure revolves essentially around a 3-tier system (Figure 1 depicts 
this architecture with its security features):  
1. Top Tier: Pervasive Service Platform (PSP) 
2. Middle Tier: Service Provisioning Platform (SPP) 
3. Bottom Tier: Access Networks (AN).  
  
 At the top of the 3-tier architectural model, Daidalos provides a platform (PSP) for the 
deployment and provision of pervasive services by providing enabling services neatly 
integrated with the traditional service-provisioning platform. These enabling services 
comprise, e.g., a pervasive service management allowing for composition of basic services 
to more sophisticated ones, a context management and a personalization subsystem for 
tailoring the services for each user’s needs. 
 For the support of traditional services and the PSP, Daidalos integrates the core network 
in terms of control & data planes and integrates these with the basic enabling services 
necessary for the operation of a carrier-grade network, a third party network and application 
services.  
 For accessing the core infrastructure Daidalos integrates many types of access networks 
ranging from ad-hoc networks over Ethernet, WLAN, GPRS/UMTS, to broadcast networks 
like DVB-H by the coherent IP solution. A special kind of access networks are sensor 
networks. Sensors are important sources of context information necessary for providing 
context-aware services. Daidalos not only provides the infrastructure for traditional sensors 
like active badges, but also for wireless sensor networks consisting of small sensors with 
limited technical capabilities like computation, communication or battery power. 
2.2 Daidalos Security Infrastructure 
Maintaining a homogeneous level of security and guaranteeing a high level of seamless 
access to services in next generation network environments is complex and challenging. 
These issues include [2]: multiple authentication mechanisms, Single-Sign-On (SSO) for 
multiple services and administrative domains which will be needed, distributed 
authorisation mechanisms, multiple identities across different providers, multiple sessions 
of multiple users using multiple devices, contracts and so forth. 
 The Daidalos Security Infrastructure provides a flexible security solution with 
components and mechanisms covering these issues. The rest of the paper discusses in detail 
how this solution is achieved. 
2.2.1 Identity and Privacy Model 
Identity management is important to maintain sensitive data and confidential relationships 
with service providers and so forth. In distributed networks users may have multiple 
contracts with different providers, using various digital identities. The identity management 
and privacy framework must be able to facilitate private information to be flexible, 
providing different levels of security and privacy, allowing users to trade privacy against 
convenience when necessary [3]. 
 In the Daidalos identity model a user can choose the identity he/she wants to use to 
authenticate and register for services. When the user first signs a contract with a Daidalos 
operator, an identity under which the contract and the respective profiles and rights are 
defined is issued. This identity, called Registration Identity (RegID), holds the information 
necessary for charging its owner, and can be seen as the system representation of the signer 
of the contract. For the purpose of having different levels of privacy, Virtual Identities 
(VIDs) are defined on-the-fly. By using different VID’s, the user can reveal different 
personal information in the context of each VID. These identities are always related to a 
RegID and can share all or none of the RegID’s attributes. As such, they are privacy-
enabled and possibly anonymous representations of the RegID.  
 This yields a concept that small amounts of personal information are much less 
sensitive than a huge aggregation of personal information. So, it is possible to split the trace 
of personal information left by the user in the system. Although, the user can use different 
VID’s towards foreign (service and network) providers, a means must be provided by 
which all actions of a user's VID’s can be accounted to a real person for monetary as well 
as for legal accountability. The home operator is assumed to be trusted to know the link of 
all VID’s to the RegID. Daidalos has taken a hybrid approach to allow user anonymity via 
pseudonyms and the utilisation of single sign-on processes (E.g.: Liberty Alliance [4]) to 
manipulate or tie those pseudonyms to a RegID [2]. 
 The SPP can utilise the PSP VID’s to provide a means for the operator to cope with this 
multiplication of user contexts. By this, a user can use different VID’s towards different 
services or service providers and foreign network providers, but all actions can be 
accounted to his contract by the home provider. 
 While this approach is a huge step forward in privacy protection, it introduces some 
configuration burden on the user. First of all, the different VID’s must be configured, i.e., it 
must be specified which information may be revealed in its context – including, e.g., setting 
the access rights for accessing context information about the user. Second, it must be 
decided when the aggregated revealed information is too privacy sensitive and the VID 
must not be used any longer. Third, the user must decide for each service to use, which VID 
to take. As this is acceptable in a traditional world of rarely changing services it needs 
extensions in a pervasive world in which a user is experiencing frequently changing 
services without even noticing it. This is where the security and privacy subsystem of the 
PSP acts and complements the respective functions of the service provisioning platform. 
2.2.2 Pervasive Service Platform Security 
The PSP is fundamentally based on information about the user’s current situation, habits 
and so forth derived from context sensitive information. Thus, it is critical that a user’s 
private information remains confidential and maintains constant integrity. The PSP layer 
provides an Identity & Privacy Management module to provide a secure service to manage 
a user’s context sensitive information. The identity & privacy management provided by the 
PSP layer is funnelled down through the underlying layers to provide global system 
privacy.  
 The security and privacy subsystem provides an enabling service of the pervasive 
service platform that allows users to automate the above-mentioned VID related actions. 
Moreover, it comprises the respective counterparts being used by third party services. The 
overall functionality consists of three parts: (1) Privacy Policy Negotiation, (2) Identity 
Management and (3) Credential Management and Access Control 
 If a new service is discovered and to be used, the Privacy Policy Negotiation module is 
invoked, which negotiates anonymously with the respective Privacy Policy Negotiation 
counterpart at the service. The result of this policy is not only a statement about what the 
service guarantees to do with the personal information being revealed during the service use 
(similar to what the Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P) [5] does) but also a list of 
personal context information the service needs for the requested service provision, e.g., the 
user’s location. 
 Based on this negotiation result, the Identity Management module selects or creates a 
VID in which context this information may be revealed. For this, it estimates the level of 
privacy invasiveness of all data being revealed in the context of the respective VID, so far. 
Finally, the Credential Management interfaces to the A4C subsystem of the service 
provisioning platform in order to create the respective authorizations for the service to 
access the negotiated context information according to the chosen VID. This module is 
complemented by the Access Control of the context management which checks the 
authorization in case of a context request again by interfacing with the A4C 
(Authentication, Authorization, Accounting, Auditing & Charging) subsystem of the 
service provisioning platform. Note, that there are also other entities in the Pervasive 
Service Platform implementation such as access control. Their description is omitted due to 
clarity reasons. A more detailed description of these modules, their inter-working and 
functionality can be found in [6]. 
2.2.3 Service Provisioning Platform Security 
From Figure 1, one can see that the different components in the general architecture are: 
Pervasive Service Platforms, Service Provisioning Platforms (SPP), Access Networks 
(AN), Mobile Terminals (MTs), (Third Party) Service Providers and a Key Interconnection. 
The circles within Figure 1 indicate where the main entities that will support the security 
architecture in the SPP, are placed. 
 
 Figure 1: Security Components in Daidalos Architecture 
 As can be seen, in order to provide security both inter-domain and intra-domain key 
management is provided, fully integrated with the access control of mobile terminals (MT) 
in the AN, and with support for the security of the operator and service provider 
infrastructures. 
2.2.3.1 Intra- and Inter-domain Key Management: 
 The ‘Key Interconnection’ is needed for enabling communication between various ‘Key 
Management’ systems within different administrative domains; that is, establishing a secure 
context between an entity belonging to one domain and an entity belonging to another. For 
that purpose, the Key Interconnection entity provides secure inter-domain key transport. 
 The ‘Key Distribution Center’ (KDC), is the component in charge of managing 
credentials, certificates and, in general, digital identities. It provides support for the 
lifecycle of identities and keys within different scenarios and for various entities requesting 
them. Additionally, it is in charge of retrieving authorization assertions from the 
Authorization Authority (AA) and storing the received material into the appropriate 
repository.  
 The Key Manager will store/recover, and in general manage, the available 
authentication/authorization material in the key-store/authorization-repository. It will also 
sign/verify supplied material. These actions will be performed upon request of the A4C 
client or PSP components (e.g., A4C client may ask the key manager to sign a charging 
guarantee to protect against repudiation). 
2.2.3.2 Security Related Protocols and Requirements: 
The Mobile Terminal (MT) is responsible for acquiring network access, where the terminal 
and/or the user are authenticated and authorized. The A4C client is the component that 
performs these functions, using the Protocol for carrying Authentication for Network 
Access (PANA) [7] and 802.1x [8]. Figure 2 illustrates the authentication related 
components of the architecture, and shows communication patterns between them. The 
design provides not only authentication but also authorization support by means of (1) 
using EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol) [9] as the basic transport protocol for 
credential management over PANA; and (2) integrating with SAML [2][3][10][11] for 
authorization. This requirement comes from the A4C infrastructure, where the AA will be 
part of the general Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) architecture. 
Authorization messages are transported by the same protocol and follow a similar path, as 
authentication messages. As illustrated in Figure 2, in order to support communication 
integrity and/or confidentiality between network elements like routers, servers, etc., IPsec 
[12] will be deployed as the basic security protocol; hence, a means to distribute and 
manage cryptographic material not only within a single domain but also across domains is 
required. If additionally the need to provide credentials and digital identities to MTs, users, 
providers and services, is identified then the conclusion is that the KDC system will be 
mainly based in a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) [13] and its associated protocols. 
 
Figure 2: Protocols and Services for Security 
 The A4C and PKI models are only part of the framework for authorization. There is a 
special need for a flexible yet unambiguous means of communicating authorization 
information between the key elements of the system users, services, and the network. Due 
to the flexibility of the approach required in order to support attribute certificates, and 
credentials in general, the option of SAML has been considered and analysed extensively in 
order to provide the AA support for Daidalos. 
2.2.3.3 Federated and Privacy-enabled Access Control: 
Within DAIDALOS the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) has been chosen for 
integrating distributed authentication, authorization and SSO into federated, Beyond-3G 
operator concepts. SAML standardizes the exchange of information about a user’s 
authentication status, authorization decisions and attributes. By applying SAML, the 
authentication infrastructure can be made independent of the specific mechanism used for 
the authentication of users. In addition, SAML supports SSO across administrative 
domains. 
 These advantages result in a decoupling of value-added service provider’s infrastructure 
from access network infrastructure on one hand (distributing services independently from 
specific access technologies), and on the other hand enabling the usage of the same security 
functionalities for network security and building secure federations among all participating 
entities. The SAML Authority in conjunction with the Identity Manager, plays an important 
role in concealing identities and protecting users’ privacy [2]. The RegID is never revealed 
and is concealed by using VID’s, provided by the PSP identity management module. 
 The Asserting Authority has the following main functionalities for concealing the 
RegID: 
• Asserting and providing information on a user’s successful authentication via an 
authentication assertion. Authentication takes place based on a user’s VID. The VID is 
mapped to the respective RegID (by accessing the Identity Manager) and an 
authentication assertion is generated and stored. Thus, the Asserting Authority can prove 
one’s authentication to another entity within the federation. 
• Issuing authorization decisions: For authorizing a specific user to a requested value-
added service, the Policy Enforcement Point of the service can request authorization 
decisions from the Authority. The Asserting Authority issues the authorization decision 
based on the policies and profiles it holds connected to the binding of the VID and the 
Service Identifier. 
• Collecting and issuing users’ attributes and profiles: If a service has to be personalized 
for the user, it may require some attributes and profiles. The authority can collect the 
required attributes from the profile associated to the VID and issue them via an attribute 
assertion. 
 
 Every request for service authorization, broadcast services or individual services, uses a 
so-called Identity Token, being an enhanced SAML artifact, issued during the primal 
authentication process. 
 Authentication and authorization for broadcast services have to be seamlessly integrated 
into future security architecture. The basic idea of the SAML-based approach is that a user 
authenticates and receives authorizations for broadcast services as he does for all network 
services [11][14]. Prior to requesting broadcast services, a user is identified by “standard” 
network authentication mechanisms. After establishing the user's identity, authorization 
decisions for broadcast service access can be taken and granted. Key material allowing the 
access to subscribed broadcast services is distributed as an integral part of the standard 
network authentication within SAML assertions and allows access to broadcasted content 
on the user’s mobile terminal. 
2.2.4 Access Networks Security 
Daidalos is implementing cryptographically generated addresses (CGA) and secure 
neighbour discovery within the IPv6 access network. This provides considerable protection 
against many of the routing attacks possible in an open access network. The Daidalos 
project has concentrated on how SEND [15] and CGA may be integrated into ad hoc 
networks and deliver fast hand over processes. Trust is bootstrapped from a low initial level 
by incrementally generating a candidate CGA, assuring this CGA is unique, establishing the 
certificate trust anchors necessary for SEND and finally once the PANA network 
authentication process has succeeded, a check can be made for certificate revocation. In the 
case of an ad hoc network Daidalos has evolved this process to provide a tunnel between a 
mobile terminal on the edge of the ad hoc cloud and its access router. 
 Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing was chosen in Daidalos as the 
most suitable candidate for a routing protocol in the ad hoc access networks. The protocol 
allows the mobile nodes to update and obtain routes quickly, as well as to destroy outdated 
routes. AODV deploys UDP messages and, since it is close to existing Internet routing 
protocols, it allows possible integration with the fixed network.  
 Secure Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (SAODV) [16] is an extension to the 
above-mentioned protocol that can be used to protect the route discovery process providing 
features such as Integrity, Authentication and Non-repudiation. The main goal is to prevent 
a malicious node forging AODV packets, listening to the others and replay attacks. 
SAODV does not describe which key management scheme should be used and, besides, it 
does not exclude the possibility to deploy a certification authority. This solution allows all 
the nodes joining the ad hoc network to download public keys plus the public key of the 
certification authority. If no certificates are used, it is assumed that SHA is the hash 
algorithm and RSA the encryption method. 
 As with any ad hoc network, there is a need to protect traffic between the Mobile 
Terminal (MT) and the router. This can be accomplished by creating an IPsec tunnel 
between the two elements. This both ensured that the MT was one virtual hop away from 
it's access router (a requirement for PANA [7]) and that data was protected from 
intermediate and rogue node interception and manipulation. However this did lead to 
problems in QoS routing decisions based on encapsulated QoS header fields. To overcome 
this problem Daidalos has ensured that these header fields were copied into the outer header 
of tunnelled packets. 
 The development of the solutions for secure charging of network traffic was another 
goal for Daidalos, particularly in ad hoc edge networks. To this end Daidalos implemented 
Secure Charging Protocol (SCP) [17]. This gave us non-refutable proofs of network usage 
that could be used in a later charging scheme. The proofs inserted in the packets use 
mechanisms considered to be secure like MD5 hashing. The control messages use Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography to minimise computational overhead. These routines are provided by a 
Common Cryptographic Library in Daidalos. The project also looked at the interoperation 
of SCP with core network A4C. 
2.2.8 Sensor Network 
The goal at this level is to aggregate data and deliver this as a data stream service into other 
services in a confidential and secure manner. The traditional way of doing this is by 
encrypting on a hop-by-hop basis within the sensor network. Encrypting data on a hop-by-
hop methodology is too computationally intensive for the sensors used in Daidalos. Thus 
Daidalos is testing unique concealed data aggregation cryptographic techniques and privacy 
homomorphic algorithms, which allow us to aggregate encrypted data at certain points in 
the sensor network without decrypting this data. This means there is reasonably strong end-
to-end confidentiality that can be used in ad hoc networks of low-power, low cost sensor 
units. 
3. Conclusions 
Daidalos provides an important security and privacy infrastructure to allow operators to 
securely provide their communication infrastructures, to allow third party providers to 
securely provide their services as well as to allow users to use the system with preservation 
of their privacy. Due to the rapid prototyping approach followed in Daidalos, the security 
and privacy framework described in the paper is already integrated in many parts of the 
core system and will conquer the other parts in the future to deliver a fully integrated secure 
mobility system for operators, service providers and end-users.  
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